Third, regarding the Korean issue, Count Katsura said that Korea was the direct cause of our war with Russia: “It is absolutely important for Japan that a complete solution to the peninsula issue be made as a logical consequence of the war. If, after the war, Korea is left to its own devices, it will certainly return to its habit of concluding reckless agreements or treaties with other powers, thus re-entering into the same international complications as before the war. In view of the above, Japan feels absolutely obliged to take a definitive step to exclude the possibility of a Korean case in its previous state and to place us again under the need to enter another foreign war… Minister Taft fully acknowledged the correctness of the Count`s remarks and noted that, in his view, the establishment of sovereign sovereignty over Korea by Japanese troops, as Korea has been committed not to enter into foreign contracts without Japan`s agreement, is the logical result of the current war and would directly contribute to lasting peace in the East. His judgment was that President Roosevelt would approve of his views in this regard, when he had no authority to assure it. When Dennett first discovered the notes, he assumed they were evidence of a very important “secret pact” between the United States and Japan to create a basic agreement that would turn the two once isolationist nations into world powers.  The talks focused on the extent of the spheres of influence of Japan and the United States and on the maintenance of peace between them in the event of Japan`s victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. Discussions between U.S. Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Tarō took place on July 27, 1905. The Japanese leader explained Japan`s reasons for creating a protectorate of Korea. He reiterated that Japan was not interested in the Philippines.  The United States had acquired the Philippines after its victory over Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898. In 1924, Tyler Dennett was the first scholar to obtain the document; He described it as “the text of the `executive agreement` perhaps the most remarkable in the history of U.S. foreign relations.
 The consensus of historians is that Dennett exaggerated the importance of a routine discussion that did not change anything and did not set new guidelines. Historians have pointed out that there is no formal agreement on anything new.  The word “agreement” in the documents simply means that both parties agreed that both the English and Japanese versions of the meeting notes covered the exact content of the conversations.  President Theodore Roosevelt then agreed that the Minister of War, Mr. Taft, had set out the American position.  Japan and the United States clashed again in the League of Nations negotiations in 1919.